South Africa has just had its fourth national elections since its transition from apartheid and white minority rule to multiracial democracy in April 1994. As expected, these were easily won by the African National Congress (ANC). It presently holds nearly 70 per cent of the 400 seats in Parliament and controls eight of the country's nine provinces. However, the elections took place against a backdrop of 18 months of political turmoil as the ANC experienced a degree of internal conflicts and reforms. crippled clinics, to revamp the education, to make the streets safer, to ensure that justice is accessible, effective and equitable, and to guarantee the independence of the watchdogs that guard our rights'. The official unemployment rate would be lowered to 14 per cent by 2014 by creating 1.4 million jobs. There would also be significant improvements in health and welfare benefits: Zuma promised free healthcare for all and an increase of child allocations up to 18 years of age, instead of to 15 as is the case at present. social and economic transformation, expectations which, 15 years after the end of apartheid, have for many been unrealised.
In the first section, we emphasise those expectations that were associated with the end of the apartheid workplace regime and the substantial revamping of labour law. In the three sections following this, we look at the changes that have taken place in three selected sectors: mining, forestry and agriculture. Our perspective is firmly rooted in a reliance on case studies as opposed to abstract generalisations derived from large datasets, notwithstanding the latters' value when rooted in a qualitative understanding of their subject -and when the data is White power was such that the assertion of racial domination blurred the lines between productive tasks and personal services. At a 'mixed' workplace, like the Highveld steel factory studied by Von Holdt, 10 a black worker always had to be at the service of a white worker, whether the latter was his superior or not. The professional status of blacks relegated them to the least qualified, most poorly remunerated, jobs; their status did not allow them to contest unfair practices or dismissal, deprived them of indirect wages such as pension or insurance, and of all potential for professional advancement. If employers' practices allowed it, only the minority of blacks who were in formal employment (from which all temporary workers were excluded)
had the capacity to bargain for improved working conditions.
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Apartheid generated individual workplace resistance from its outset, but working conditions only started improving in the wake of the violent strikes of 1973 in Durban. Von Holdt shows how blurring the distinction between racial and technical hierarchies, on top of being inefficient, generated a humiliation and a frustration that played a decisive role in the emergence of unions. Soon In order to supply this sector with an abundant and cheap workforce, specific social relations of production as well as spatial configurations were developed.
These features have been exhaustively detailed in numerous studies and so we will do no more than mention briefly their key features here. The division of labour and tasks was strongly related to race, as illustrated by the separation between white 'miners' (allowed to work with explosives) and black 'mineworkers' (confined to basic tasks such as hand-digging or excavating)
going back to the early 1920s. 19 This organisation of production was complemented by a system based on migrant labour drawn from rural labour reserves and neighbouring countries (Lesotho and Swaziland, but also Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique). 20 This spatial structure was integral to the apartheid legal framework 21 and persisted until 1994. Second, outsourcing of labour has developed rapidly;
All these new companies generally invest in temporary mining activities, the profitability of which mainly depends on a considerable reorganisation of labour. As such, productivity gains are generally realised thanks to a reduction in production costs achieved through the deterioration of working and living conditions of labourers. Although some mining companies, often as a result of union pressure, have imposed, working conditions more or less comparable to their own on their formal contractors, nevertheless contracting often goes hand in hand with deteriorating working conditions. In this case, contractors, representing both formal as well as non-registered companies, employ workers in poorer, even illegal, labour conditions. Such practices are observed in all types of mining companies, which resort to using these contractors to evade certain legislative requirements and limit union action. In these cases, contracting is mainly a means to change working conditions without having to negotiate with workers or their unions. 36 The 'timber industry' includes forestry and primary transformation industries (saw mills, pulp and paper etc). The term 'forestry' covers the production cycle of timber, from growing trees (silviculture) to felling, debarking and transport. Africa's GDP), and employed more than 170,000 people, 60,000 of whom were in forestry.
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The contracting-out of forestry operations began in the late 1980s, at the time when urban unrest against the apartheid regime reached rural areas and forestry workers, in large part through the activism of unionised factory (paper and sawmills) workers.
But, since the end of the 1980s, the sector has been experiencing a crisis, which in turn is linked -as we will see -to the outsourcing of forestry operations. Within a period of just a few years, forestry companies had outsourced their entire operations, encouraging their forestersall white -to set themselves up as contractors. The first to outsource were the pulp and paper giants, Sappi and Mondi, whose activities were integrated vertically 'from stump to mill' traditionally, and who are referred to as growersproducers (GPs). Production of timber was, in effect, traditionally subsidised by that of pulp and paper, both of which had a much higher market value. Thus, by contracting out the most labour-intensive part of their activities, the GPs effectively transferred their risks to their contractors, paying them for actual production only, without providing any technical assistance. Empowerment (BBBEE) policy, which supports the creation of small blackowned businesses as part of a development and poverty reduction strategy. But most of these entrepreneurs struggle to keep their businesses afloat; reimbursing debts accumulated to finance the business is often the main motivation to continue until bankruptcy. Moreover, the difficulties they endure to ensure the reproduction of their means of production often leads to the suffocation of their household income. Small contractors tend to divert resources from the family budget (school fees, food) to pay workers or fix equipment. 47 In other words, they experience a reproduction squeeze as they exhaust domestic resources (reproduction as labour) in order to keep their businesses afloat (reproduction as capital); they are more akin to the African petty-commodity producers described by Bernstein than to promising capitalists. 48 The forestry industry has thus suffered greatly from outsourcing: the bankruptcy of many foresters-turnedcontractors has deprived the sector of qualified professionals; productivity and production have declined and the number of criminal acts on plantations (arson, timber theft, etc.) has risen.
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This crisis has profoundly affected the forestry workforce, leading to a rapid casualisation of working conditions. unloading onto their contractors is in large part assumed by the workers themselves, who are subjected to task work (that is, they are paid upon completion of a set task rather than of a work day). This practice, common in forestry, has become a means of intolerable exploitation: the task is indexed on the productivity necessary to achieve the production stipulated in the contract between the forestry company and the contractor, rather than on the capacity of workers. Many of them are paid between R300 and R500 per month for hard and often dangerous labour. The tasks demanded are often beyond workers' physical capacity; moreover, they are usually not given adequate training and lack experience and proper equipment. Their resulting inability to perform the required tasks allows contractors to underpay them and further reduce costs. A frequently-observed mechanism to transfer production risks to workers is the refusal to adapt tasks to changing weather conditions, a determining factor in debarking, since dry bark is very hard to tear. The daily 'task race' pushes workers to take risks, further increasing the danger associated with forestry work.
Employers are, however, extremely unwilling to recognise work-related injuries; they often do not pay their insurance contributions and their principal companies threaten not to renew their contract if the number of reported accidents increases.
Living conditions in forestry compounds have also deteriorated dramatically due to widespread overpopulation in these 'worker villages', isolated in the middle of plantations, and to the withdrawal of GPs from their direct management.
Compound management has also been outsourced, with little supervision as is the case with other forestry activities; workers living in crowded tents are occur frequently in Mpumalanga.
In rural areas, until the 1990s, forestry workers formed a sort of proletarian élite compared to workers in agriculture, because they were employed by large companies who had conceded a number of social advantages to them, often as a result of action by workers in transformation industries. Due to the impact of outsourcing, however, forestry has come to be seen as a last resort and many even prefer to work in sugar cane or citrus plantations, where conditions are reputed to be very difficult. All indirect incomes have been cut from forestry workers' wages and the duration of contracts, often based on the contractor's own contract (generally one year), has sometimes been shortened to three months. Even so, the fact that state intervention was considered necessary reflects the severity of the problems of working relations in rural areas, as is further documented below. have shaped working and living conditions. Again, the history of this expropriation is well known and need only be sketched briefly here. As a result of the appropriation of land by white settlers, many non-whites were confined to some 13 per cent of the country made up of small, scattered and infertile pieces of land under communal tenure, often leaving them with the sole option to become sharecroppers on white farmland. 54 These measures served first the process of land appropriation by whites, leading to the displacement of millions of non-whites, and second, the suffocation of the African peasantry. 55 Subordinated and deprived of their own economic resources, these populations became a reserve army of labour for white agriculture and industries for which, as we have seen above, a migrant labour system was established. These laws also allowed whites to evict black workers living on their land and so increased the harshness of labour conditions. Sharecropping agreements -considered too generous -were gradually transformed into paid agricultural labour and, in Natal, into 'labour tenancy', a system in which work was supplied in exchange for the right to live on the farm land. 56 million people, during the same period, and an additional 730,000 people in the last ten years of apartheid were expelled from white-owned land. 57 Until 1994 farm workers did not have the right to organise themselves or to join a union.
In the Agricultural Sector, a Failure to Secure Land and Labour
Their working conditions were poor: onerous tasks and workdays frequently in excess of 12 hours for extremely low wages, which were often paid in kind. The relationships between farm workers and owners were characterised by dependence and paternalism.
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After 1994, the LRA and BCEA provided legal protection for agricultural workers. Even though no minimum wage was set at the time, they created a general framework for improved employment conditions with, inter alia, the regulation of working hours and the abolition of child labour. Moreover, in order to transform the structure of land ownership in the country, as well as to ensure political, social and economic stability, the government launched a land reform programme. In addition to land transfers, tenure reform aimed to secure land rights for non-whites. To protect agricultural workers' land rights, Parliament passed the Labour Tenants Act (LTA) in 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) in 1997, which provided a legal framework governing evictions. With the exception of people who had worked and lived for more than 20 years on a farm, however, these laws did not protect workers' residency rights; but nonetheless they guaranteed that a court would control evictions.
Not only was permission to reside on the farm dependent on work, making it liable to be revoked with loss of employment but workers were (and are sometimes still) also dependent on the farmer to provide basic necessities, often creating a cycle of indebtedness. The casualisation of work is even more worrisome since it is accompanied by a withdrawal of the state and the end of the paternalism of apartheid. As
Barchiesi remarks:
Macro-economic paradigms have greatly constrained the government's ability to use state expenditures and social grants to address massive poverty and social inequality arising from the country's deepening employment crisis. The ANC government has, therefore, opted for symbolic compensation by continuously praising wage labour as the cornerstone of social discipline and inclusion. In this way it has, ironically, operated in substantial continuity with apartheid-era social policy discourse.
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Because of the historical weakness of social policy and of the persistence of mass unemployment, a strong family-and sometimes community-based solidarity survives in South Africa. Most workers work to support their family. Yet another consequence, difficult to quantify but obviously dramatic, of labour casualisation is that the ability of the employed to save money for their family has been drastically reduced, affecting an important number of (often invisible) dependents and unemployed who rely on this support to survive. For agricultural workers and their families, this even translates into the loss of access to land and housing.
Another factor is the increase of the active population linked to the feminisation of the workforce, (…) the pervasive demands of incorporating an emerging developing economy such as South Africa into the national (sic) global economy is being understood as the most appropriate route towards obtaining sustainable economic growth.
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This economic strategy, which has been followed by those who have ruled South
Africa since 1994, also reflects the transition compromise struck between the ANC and the large South African conglomerates. 76 These observations arise from the fact that a trickle-down economic policy discourse has been adopted which distinguishes the so-called successful 'first' from the unsuccessful 'second' economy.
Moreover, the development of black small, medium and micro enterprises through preferential contracting of poor and exploited people is thus sanitised, with no attempt to counteract the increasing casualisation and vulnerability of labourers. This artificial separation justifies the perpetuation (or the reinvention) of a society where the functional articulation between poverty and wealth (largely through the reproduction of a cheap labour force) is seen as natural and justifiable. Policies to address the labour, economic and social division and inequality -which could undermine the position and health of the 'first economy' -are thus not seen as relevant.
As a result, the improvements of working conditions won during the last years of apartheid, through the pressure of union battles against despotic, often violent, practices, were followed by a casualisation that has exposed workers to the 'dull compulsions of economic forces' (in Marx's terms). This faceless violence, presented as necessary, is one that labourers must impose on themselves. Fifteen years after the end of apartheid, under which labour markets This outcome is strikingly (and tragically) ironic: access to new, longawaited, political rights is concomitant with a collapse of the material means of actually using them! This labour crisis points to the essential and potentially destabilising contradiction of the economic policies that the South African government has followed since 1994, mixing economic liberalism and wilful redistribution. The Polokwane landslide in favour of Jacob Zuma (or possibly against Thabo Mbeki) and recent violence undoubtedly indicate that this model of development is reaching its limits in terms of political toleration.
